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Abstract To be and to remain ethical requires struggle
from organizations. Struggling is necessary due to the
pressures and temptations management and employees
encounter in and around organizations. As the relevance of
struggle for business ethics has not yet been analyzed
systematically in the scientific literature, this paper devel-
ops a theory of struggle that elaborates on the meaning and
dimensions of struggle in organizations, why and when it is
needed, and what its antecedents and consequences are. An
important conclusion is that the greater the ethics gap and
opposing forces, the greater the struggle required. Viewing
business ethics as struggle has several implications for
theory and practice.
Keywords Ethics gap  Dilemma  Struggle  Virtue 
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Introduction
It is not only important for business organizations to
become ethical (Goodstein et al. 2014; Sims 2009), but also
to remain ethical. Organizations may start slipping when
existing ethical norms become less embedded, but an ethics
gap between what ought to be done and what is done can
also arise when new ethical norms emerge, which are
subsequently not fully embedded in the organization.
Over the past few decades, new, more demanding
ethical norms for organizations have emerged concerning
bribery (Weber and Getz 2004), insider trading (Moore
1990), salaries (Nichols and Subramaniam 2001), fair
trade (Jaffee 2010), the natural environment (Gladwin
et al. 1995), animals (Janssens and Kaptein 2014), lob-
bying (Hamilton and Hoch 1997), supply chain respon-
sibility (Van Tulder et al. 2009), human rights
(Muchlinski 2012), and investing (Hudson 2005). These
ethical norms are developed in response to new issues
(such as bitcoins), trends (such as globalization), scandals
and crisis (such as the financial-economic crisis at the end
of the first decade of this century), information (such as
about the damage of corruption), paradigms (such as
stakeholder instead of shareholder thinking, Paine 2002),
and new theories (such as an ethics of care, Lawrence and
Maitlis 2012).
Besides general developments that lead to the emer-
gence of new ethical norms for organizations, organiza-
tion-specific developments can also generate new norms.
For example, the production or provision of a new type of
product or service, the entering of new markets and
regions, a change of governance structure, and the
appearance of new stakeholders may all lead to new
ethical norms. To prevent an ethics gap from arising,
organizations should thus not only maintain current ethi-
cal norms, but they should also adopt and embed new
ethical norms.
Several factors have been cited to explain the origin of
ethics gaps at organizations, such as deinstitutionalization
(Oliver 1991; Westphal and Zajac 2001), decoupling
(MacLean and Behnam 2010; Stevens et al. 2005), disen-
gagement (Bandura 1999; Moore et al. 2012), rationaliza-
tion, and socialization (Ashforth and Anand 2003), a
decrease in quality of ethics programs (Weaver et al.
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1999a; Kaptein 2008), a decline in the ethical culture (Sims
and Brinkmann 2003), and diminished attention to ethics
by the board (Ocasio 1997; Weaver et al. 1999a, b).
Although all of these explanations have value, the question
remains as to why these factors occur. Why, for example,
does decoupling take place, and why does the attention to
ethics by boards diminish?
In this paper, I propose that the origin and size of ethics
gaps lie in the struggle an organization and its managers
and employees engage in. For this purpose, a struggle
theory of ethics will be developed. The central message of
this paper is that without struggling, ethics gaps will arise
in organizations, and the greater the ethics gap the more the
struggle will be needed. This paper therefore examines the
meaning of struggle, why and when it is required, and what
its antecedents and consequences are. Due to the centrality
of struggle, I employ the metaphor of ethics battlefields to
describe organizations.
The Organization as Ethics Battlefield
Struggle
The term struggle is frequently used in publications about
the ethics of business organizations. We read in newspaper
articles and reports that ‘‘The Coca-Cola Company strug-
gles with ethical crises’’ (Ferrell and Fraedrich 2014), Shell
is ‘‘struggling to build a better world’’ (Tangen 2003), and
‘‘Young bankers struggle with ethics’’ (Clarke 2013), or
about ‘‘H&M’s struggle for ethical and sustainable fash-
ion’’ (Fashion United 2014). Academic articles also cite the
term struggle frequently, such as ‘‘ethics and compliance
officers […] struggle with internal legitimacy’’ (Trevin˜o
et al. 2014, p. 187), ‘‘multinational businesses […] struggle
with employment practice issues’’ (Trevin˜o and Brown
2004, p. 69), and a ‘‘manager struggles with trying to find
moral justified way (Velasquez 2000, p. 350). Dey (2007)
uses the term in the subtitle of his article ‘‘Social
accounting at Traidcraft: a struggle for the meaning of fair
trade,’’ whereas the title of Radin and Calkins’s (2006)
even reads ‘‘The struggle against sweatshops.’’ A man-
agement book has also recently been published with the
title ‘‘The good struggle’’ (Badaracco 2013). But what does
the term struggle mean?
The term struggle has not been defined clearly in the
academic literature; only the related concepts such as
conflict—see, e.g., Boulding (1962)—are well defined.
Dictionaries give us more guidance. The Oxford Dic-
tionary defines struggle as to ‘‘strive to achieve or attain
something in the face of difficulty or resistance,’’
whereas Dictionary.com defines struggle as ‘‘to contend
with an adversary or opposing force.’’ Based on the
definitions of struggle provided by these and other dic-
tionaries, four characteristics of struggle can be
distinguished.
First, there is an object at stake which is deemed valu-
able (cf. Badaracco 2013). People can struggle for a better
environment, which implies that a better environment is
valuable to them. People can also struggle against some-
thing that is undesirable, such as poverty, because there is
something else they value, in this case prosperity.
Second, in a struggle, the object of value is not yet
realized or guaranteed. What is valued has not been
secured yet—it is something which people want to realize
or preserve because its future existence is not certain. So
there is a risk of losing or not realizing something valuable.
Third, the risk of losing or not being able to realize
something valuable is created by adversarial or opposing
forces. Those forces work against the achievement or
preservation of the valued object, as opposition (Webster
Dictionary) or conflict (Oxford Dictionary) is experienced
(Cambridge Dictionary). There is resistance that makes it
difficult or even very difficult (Oxford Dictionary) to
achieve or preserve that which is valuable.
Fourth, in a struggle, dealing with opposing forces
requires great effort (Cambridge Dictionary; Merrian
Webster). One should, as the Oxford Dictionary states, ‘‘get
free of restraint or constriction.’’ Because of the difficulty to
resist or defeat opposing forces, a struggle is not just a matter
of devoting time and energy; it requires intense, demanding,
tough and strenuous effort (The Free Dictionary).
Given these four characteristics, a struggle is not nec-
essarily physical; it can also be psychological or intellec-
tual. Neither does a struggle necessarily involve human
opponents, as the opposing forces can also be nonhuman,
such as evil ideologies (Adams and Balfour 1998). A
struggle can be related to external forces but these forces
can also be internal, such as one’s own evil thoughts
(Hering 1997). A struggle does not necessarily have to last
long, it can also be brief—as long as it is demanding.
Finally, whether a struggle is good or bad does not depend
on whether the goal is to defeat the bad or achieve the
good, but whether the object one is trying to realize or
preserve is deemed good or bad (cf. Badaracco 2013). An
ethics struggle therefore involves great effort to achieve or
attain an object of value in the face of opposing forces that
are difficult to resist or defeat.
Pressures and Temptations
Applying this definition of struggle to business organiza-
tions, the question is, if the ethical performance of business
organizations is valuable (characteristic 1 of a struggle) and
it is not attained or realized (characteristic 2), what the
opposing forces are (characteristic 3), and why it requires
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great effort to resist or defeat those forces (characteristic
4). Based on research among white-collar criminals,
Cressey (1953) identified two forces that stimulate people
to unethical behavior,1 namely pressures and temptations
(see also Tenbrunsel 1998). Pressures are forces that push
people toward unethical behavior whereas temptations are
those forces that pull people toward unethical behavior.
Since these forces can be found in and around all organi-
zations, and are hard to resist or defeat, every organization
can be seen as an ethics battlefield.
The pressures organizations encounter have their origin
in conflicting stakeholder interests and expectations.
Stakeholders are those persons and institutions whose
interests may be affected by the functioning of the orga-
nization (Donaldson and Dunfee 1994; Freeman 1984).
They invest in the organization through different means:
money as shareholders; time, expertise, and energy as
employees; products and services as suppliers, and money
as customers—on which all expect an acceptable return
(Etzioni 1998). Other stakeholders, such as citizens living
in the vicinity of an organization, are largely subject to
negative impacts related to the functioning of an organi-
zation, such as noise and traffic nuisance, and therefore
expect these impacts to be minimalized.
The interests and expectations of different stakeholders
can conflict with one another (Neville and Menguc 2006).
As the business environment is not munificent (Staw and
Szwajkowski 1975), organizations have to compete for
resources in the labor market (for employees), financial
market (for capital), supply market (for materials), and
customer market (for sales). Within a business organiza-
tion, scarcity is also a factor, in the sense that time, money,
knowledge, and attention is limited (Cyert and March
1963; Hambrick and Snow 1977; Ocasio 1997). As a result,
all stakeholder expectations cannot be fully realized at the
same time. The organization has to make choices as to
which interests to honor (more), or less—or not at all (Hill
and Jones 1992). These choices, often accompanied by
dilemmas, are inevitable given that scarcity is an inherent
feature of the economic system (Kaptein and Wempe
2002).
Faced with dilemmas, people in organizations may feel
under pressure to meet interests and expectations of
stakeholders which cannot be fully met. Furthermore,
when stakeholders know that there is a risk that their
interests and expectations will not be fully met, they may
exert more pressure on the organization to meet their
demands (Mitchell et al. 1997). Research also shows that
many organizations often operate under very high pres-
sure (Gonza´lez-Benito and Gonza´lez-Benito 2010; Sjo¨s-
tro¨m 2008; Waddock et al. 2002). For example, Martin
et al. (2007) found that when organizations vie with
competitors for scarce resources, they experience height-
ened pressure to succeed and to survive (cf. Baucus and
Near 1991).
Given these pressures on organizations, the temptation
exists to not balance all stakeholder interests and expec-
tations in an ethical manner, but rather to honor most of
those stakeholders who exert the most pressure on the
organization (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Likewise, it also
easier and therefore tempting to honor more of those
stakeholders who are most important for the organization
as it best serves the interests of the organization. In a
similar vein, it can be tempting to disproportionally honor
the interests of those stakeholders who are served by short-
term, direct, certain (financial) results; it is more visible,
and therefore easier than pursuing long-term, indirect,
uncertain, and nonfinancial interests (cf. Fishbach and Shah
2006; Keizer 2010).
Temptations can be found not only around organizations
but also within them. The very nature of organizations
gives rise to different internal temptations to engage in
unethical behavior. The division of labor is a defining
feature of organizations (Smith 2009), and while clearly
defined tasks increases efficiency, it also harbors the
temptation of excessive individualism, where people focus
exclusively on their individual tasks even if it causes harm
to others or would be better to do other things (cf. Simons
and Chabris 1999; Staw and Boettger 1990). The hierar-
chical structure of organizations brings with it another
temptation, namely conformity. It involves following
orders even if it is unethical or it would be better to do
other things, purely because ‘this is the way organizations
work’ (cf. Litzky et al. 2006; Milgram 1974). Another
temptation comes with the authority people are given in
organizations to perform certain tasks and the corre-
sponding opportunity to misuse it (De Cremer et al. 2009;
Pitesa and Thau 2013). A final example of an internal
temptation concerns the risk of goal displacement, which
arises when the organization is perceived as a goal in itself
rather than a means to serve the interests and expectations
of stakeholders (Kerr, 1975).
Human Vulnerability
Pressures and temptations are inherent to the functioning of
markets, organizations, and stakeholders, but it does not
explain why it is difficult to resist or defeat these forces. If
pressures and temptations are like heat and oxygen, there
has to be fuel to have a fire (cf. Albrecht et al. 2008). For
unethical behavior to exist, humans have to engage in
1 Cressey (1953) found rationalization to be a third explanatory
factor. Since it is not an external force, it is not included here. Casey’s
other factor, opportunity, will be restricted to temptation because we
are only interested here in the part that stimulates unethical behavior.
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unethical behavior. Humans succumb to unethical behavior
because they are vulnerable to pressures and temptations.
The question whether human beings are inherently good
or bad is one of the oldest in the history of intellectual
thought and many a philosopher, political scientist, and
theologian have articulated their different views (cf. Kin-
neging 2009; Messadie´ 1996; Neiman 2004). According to
Augustine (1982), people are inclined to do evil; humans
suffer from a deficiency, both cognitive and conative, thus
crude human nature should be conquered. For Machiavelli
(1992), humans are inclined to do bad rather than good;
they will act on their evil instincts whenever the opportu-
nity arises, and they will only do good if circumstances
force them to. For Spinoza (1985), to conquer evil or to be
released from it belongs to the deeper motives of human
behavior. For him, humans are offenders and victims at the
same time. According to Kant (1785/2002), all humans
have the capacity for good and evil; every human being has
the potential to do evil deeds in the face of temptation.
According to Kant, however, the capacity for evil deeds
can be overcome, given that the capacity to do good is not
extinguishable. According to Hobbes (1928), the human
heart is the seat of multiple contending passions, but the
unbeatable passion is called the will. Hume (2012) offers
one of the most positive views, given that for him every
human being is capable of altruism and benevolence. What
these and other theories on human nature underscore is the
vulnerability of human beings to pressures and temptations.
Empirical research in (social) psychology, criminology,
behavioral economics, and behavioral business ethics
confirms this vulnerability in humans. Pioneering experi-
ments have shown that ‘‘ordinary people’’ who are gener-
ally perceived to be good (Zimbardo 2007, p. vii) are
capable of grossly unethical behavior. The experiments of
Ash (1955) have shown that the social pressure of a group
can make people lie, whereas Milgram (1974) has shown
that under pressure to carry out the instructions of an
authority figure, a high number of people are capable of
administering deadly shocks to another. Zimbardo (2007)
has shown that the pressure to conform to a particular role
can lead people to mistreat others. More recent experi-
ments in laboratory settings, such as having the opportunity
to commit fraud during exams (Mazar and Ariely 2006)
and stealing money (Mazar and Zhong 2010), as well as
field experiments with lost wallets (Wiseman 2011) and
receiving too much change (Azar et al. 2013), indicate that
human beings are susceptible to pressures and temptations.
That people are vulnerable to pressures and temptations
need not to be considered as a gloomy state of affairs.
Being susceptible does not necessarily imply that people
always do bad things. Aristotle (Rowe and Broadie 2002)
taught that while humans are confronted with conflicts that
pull them in different directions, they ought and are able to
strive for the middle road. Mead et al. (2009, p. 597) even
speak of human beings being torn between ‘‘taking what
they can get away with and doing what is socially valued
and appropriate.’’ However, as Kant (1785/2002) posited,
that people are inclined to do bad things does not mean
they are doomed to do bad things. If that were the case,
people would do bad things whenever the opportunity
arises. Empirical research also shows that people are
willing and able to act ethically in the face of temptation
(Dovidio et al. 2006; Gintis et al. 2003). Thus, although
people are vulnerable to pressures and temptations to
behave unethically, they are at the same time not doomed
to unethical behavior. This creates room to resist pressures
and temptations, and this is where struggle comes into
view.2
Dimensions of Ethics Struggle
Objects of Ethics Struggle
Pressures and temptations to behave unethically, and the
human susceptibility to them, make it difficult to resist or
even defeat these forces. For this reason, organizations face
an ethics battle, and this struggle has three objects.
First, there is the struggle against unethical behavior to
avoid sliding downhill. Organizations have to combat
pressures and temptations that threaten existing ethical
norms. The temptation to succumb to the threat new
developments pose, and lapse into unethical practices, has
to be pushed back. For example, organizations may face
pressures from the stock market to increase their profits and
be tempted to lower the quality of products, pay bribes to
get new business, or commit accounting fraud. Martin et al.
(2007), for example, found that the tougher the competi-
tion, the more likely organizations are to resort to unethical
behavior to undermine their rivals.
Second, there is the struggle for ethical behavior in order
to move uphill. As noted in the introduction, new ethical
norms can emerge as a result of general or specific
developments. However, organizations can face opposing
forces in their attempt to adopt and implement them, which
should be combatted. Resistance to the adoption and
implementation of new norms can arise because of its
2 Pressures and temptations are not by definition bad in themselves.
For example, an attractive colleague is not bad because his or her
appearance may be a temptation for others. Pressures and temptations
can also stimulate ethical behavior. Machiavelli (1992) posits that
certain pressures make us to do good things, such as peer pressure.
Weaver et al. (1999a, 1999b) also note the pressures organizations
confront to do ethical things. Hence, although this paper focuses on
pressures and temptations to do unethical things, it is not to deny the
existence of pressures and temptations to do ethical things.
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potential to change the current distribution of power and
benefits (Piderit 2000; Thomas et al. 2011). Dey (2007)
describes the struggle at Traidcraft Plc where the intro-
duction of fair trade principles led to a conflict with the
imperatives of operating as a commercial enterprise, and
where the latter won. Regarding this type of struggle,
Graetz and Mashaw (1994) talk of a moral crusade, which
they describe as a struggle over both the right and the good.
Third, there is the struggle with ethical dilemmas.
Organizations are not only required to struggle against evil
and for the good, they can also be confronted with situa-
tions in which they have to choose between two or more
good things (Badaracco 1997) or between two or more bad
things (Leibniz 2000). MacIntyre (1984) observes that it is
not only possible for ethical virtues to be rivals, they can
even be at war with each other. For Morgan (1986, p. 127),
organizations often have ‘‘competing value systems’’ from
which dilemmas arise. Such dilemmas cause an ethics
struggle when it is unclear as to what the ethical thing is to
do. Graafland et al. (2006) have collected different types of
ethical dilemmas executives wrestle with and they illustrate
how difficult it is to resolve these dilemmas and how
painful the decision-making process can be.
Other Dimensions
To be able to study the struggle organizations are engaged
in, we have to identify the different dimensions of ethics
struggles. Next to the objects of a struggle as described
above, a struggle can vary in terms of location, duration,
intensity, and strategy.
Location
As mentioned above, a struggle can take place between
people or within a person. A struggle between people can
take place within the organization, for example, within a
team or between teams, hierarchical levels, or different
functions (e.g., the backoffice with the front office), or
parties external to the organization can be involved, such as
societal stakeholders.
Duration
The duration of a struggle concerns the period a struggle
spans. A struggle can, for example, take place in one
meeting when opponents need to be persuaded, or for many
years, as in the case of certain multinationals that opposed
South Africa’s apartheid regime during the 1980s. Ciulla
(2011) even refers to ethics as a constant struggle. The
duration of a struggle is not equal to its intensity, as it is
likely to fluctuate.
Intensity
The intensity of a struggle refers to the dedication of the
different parties to the struggle. Such dedication can be
expressed through the time, money, energy, and attention
devoted (cf. Kahneman 1973; Weick 1995). As mentioned
above, struggle requires great effort; it demands suffering
and sacrifice. This is the case when the struggle is
accompanied by uncertainty, risk, emotional concern, and
discomfort. For example, terminating a very lucrative
business relationship for ethical reasons can be a financial
blow, elicit strong criticism, and raise serious doubts about
having made the right decision. Or, to give another
example, assigning greater authority to ethics officers in an
organization can provoke annoyance from managers who
may feel that it undermines their autonomy. The intensity
of a struggle multiplied by its duration represents the
magnitude of a struggle.
Strategy
The strategy that is pursued in a struggle can also vary. The
literature on self-control presents several strategies to deal
with the temptations of smoking, overconsumption, and
adultery (cf. Fishbach and Converse 2010; Vohs and
Baumeister 2011), whereas the military science literature
presents a variety of strategies to deal with enemies
(Greene 2007; Heuser 2010; Von Clausewitz 2004). Four
main strategies can be identified to deal with pressures and
temptations. First, there is the offensive strategy, where the
struggle consists in eliminating (Wertenbroch 1998) or
attenuating (Ayadi et al. 2013) pressures or temptations,
whether at their root or at their point of impact. Examples
of this strategy include laying off employees who refuse to
improve their ethical behavior, decreasing bonuses, and
locking valuables up in a safe. Another strategy is the
escape strategy, or what Ayadi et al. (2013) refers to as
avoidance. In this strategy, the struggle consists in trying to
escape from pressures or temptations by, for example,
withdrawing from a country where human rights violations
are at the order of the day, and splitting up functions that
combine conflicting responsibilities. By contrast, the rec-
onciliation strategy, as propagated by Hampden-Turner
and Trompenaars (2008), aims to turn pressure and temp-
tation to behave unethically into an incentive to behave
ethically, such as making ethical performance a criterion
for receiving bonuses, making agreements with competi-
tors to sell ethical products, and turning the biggest
opponent to a new ethics policy into the biggest proponent.
Apart from turning opposing forces around, or moving
away from them, there is also another strategy. The strat-
egy of resistance requires facing temptations and pressures
and not to be influenced by them. This strategy can be
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likened to Shiffman’s (1984) advice on coping with the
temptation to smoke: by finding substitutes and distrac-
tions, thinking about the negative effects of smoking, or the
positive consequences of not smoking. Trope and Fishbach
(2000) suggest self-imposed penalties and rewards as a way
to resist temptations. In the context of organizations, this
strategy translates, for example, into developing a business
code of ethics, having a robust monitoring and control
framework, and running an ethics training program.
A Model of Ethics Struggle
Having discussed the nature of ethics struggles in organi-
zations, their different dimensions and why they are
required, the question arises as to what their antecedents
and consequences are. Figure 1 presents a simple model of
the antecedents and consequences of ethics struggles (with
the number of the proposition in brackets) that are dis-
cussed in this section.3
Magnitude of Struggles
Pressures and Temptations
It has been argued above that organizations have to
struggle to remain ethical due to the existence of pressures
and temptations. The magnitude of a struggle depends on
the intensity and duration of the pressures and temptations;
the greater and longer the pressures and temptations, the
more the struggle that is required. Liu et al. (2014), for
example, note that when an organization expands, its
structure becomes more complex. Competing goals
between units can generate conflicts, increasing the fre-
quency of temptations for opportunistic behaviors. Such an
increase in pressures and temptations would require, ceteris
paribus, greater struggle to prevent (the widening of) an
ethics gap. The first proposition therefore is
Proposition 1: The greater the pressure and tempta-
tion to behave unethically, the greater the struggle
required.
Ethics Gap
The magnitude of a struggle is also determined by the
ethics gap. The bigger the ethics gap, the greater the need
for struggle to bridge that gap. As the distance between the
current situation and the desired situation becomes larger,
the road is longer, and more effort is required to succeed.
For example, it is more of a struggle to convince all
employees instead of one percent, to reduce CO2 emissions
with fifty percent instead of one percent; and to improve
the ethical performance on human rights, to put in place a
sustainable supply chain as well as systems to ensure
transparency than it is to improve only one of these areas.
The second proposition therefore is
Proposition 2: The bigger the ethics gap, the greater
the struggle required.
Conditions for Struggle
How do we explain the type of struggle organizations and
people engage in? Virtue ethics focuses on the desirable
characteristics or qualities to ensure success (MacIntyre
1984). In Greek antiquity, virtues were strongly associated
with the qualities and characteristics required to be suc-
cessful on the battlefield. Viewing organizations as a bat-
tlefield thus requires identifying those virtues that will
enable organizations and people to struggle successfully.
An important requirement for struggle is combativeness.
Combativeness is therefore a desirable characteristic of
individuals as well as organizations for engaging in
struggle.
Personal Combativeness
In order to struggle, managers and employees should pos-
sess the quality of combativeness. Muraven et al. (1998)
Fig. 1 A model for ethics struggle
3 The negative impact of a struggle on the magnitudes of the
pressures and temptations will not be discussed in this section as it has
already been noted in the previous section that some strategies of
struggle aim to reduce the pressure and temptation. Also the relation
between individual combativeness and organizational combativeness
will not be worked out into a proposition as organizational
combativeness will be introduced as positively influencing the
combativeness of individual members of an organization, whereas
individual combativeness can create and improve organizational
combativeness.
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present and test a strength model for individuals to cope
with temptations. Baumeister and Exline (2000) even
regard strength, which they (Baumeister and Exline 1999)
liken to a muscle, as the most important virtue. Although
strength is an important characteristic of combativeness,
there are also other important characteristics. Research that
has been conducted on self-control (Baumeister and Exline
1999), self-efficacy (Bandura 1994), and self-regulation
(Boekaerts et al. 2005) is especially helpful in defining
these characteristics.
The first characteristic of combativeness is wisdom.
Wisdom is one of the cardinal virtues in the Western
philosophical tradition (Carr 1988; Moberg 1999) and is
also an important condition for meaningful struggle.
Aristotle (Rowe and Broadie 2002) alerted us to the risk of
striving toward evil, while we think it is good. For a
struggle to be good or ethical, it is important to be aware of
the ethical norms we depart from and those we strive
toward. Furthermore, knowledge and insight are important
in order to take wise decisions about when and where
struggle is called for, and which strategy to deploy.
The second characteristic of combativeness is strong
moral conviction. While wisdom concerns knowledge,
moral conviction is about how deep this knowledge is
rooted. Integrity implies standing for something which in
turn requires a solid foundation, that is, to be firmly rooted.
As Kaptein and Wempe (2002) argue, a person of integrity
has a set of steadfast beliefs that define who they are and
what they stand for. Unlike the moral chameleon, external
forces do not sway them. The more strongly someone
stands for something, the more that person can be said to
have integrity (Calhoun 1995). It implies a commitment to
convictions that enables the individual to face pressures
and temptations that threaten to undermine those convic-
tions. The stronger a person’s convictions, the more it is
intertwined with their identity, and the more they will
protect it and strive to integrate them with new related
norms. As Erikson (1993) states, a person with integrity
accepts responsibility for their actions and rarely appeals to
external forces to explain or justify their behavior.
The third characteristic of combativeness is self-control,
what Aristoteles referred to as enkrateia (as opposed to a
lack of self-control, akrasia). For Aristotle, self-control or
the disciplining of desires is the first goal of human moral
development. De Ridder et al. (2012, p. 77) define self-
control as ‘‘the capacity to alter or override dominant
response tendencies, and to regulate behavior, thoughts,
and emotions.’’ Self-control is required in order not to be
influenced by temptations and pressures, or at least to
refrain from engaging in unethical behavior in the face of
pressures and temptations. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)
provide evidence that low self-control is an important
factor in producing criminal and antisocial behavior.
LaRose and Eastin (2002) show that self-control is required
in order to deal with temptations in a rational manner.
The fourth characteristic of combativeness is willpower.
As Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007) put it, willpower refers to
the strength of will to face and resolve ethical challenges
and to confront obstacles that may stand in the way of
proceeding with the right action. Willpower is the moti-
vational strength to remain and become ethical. Willpower
differs from self-control in that it promotes or drives
desirable behavior (it moves us forward on the track)
whereas self-control prevents undesirable behavior (it helps
us stay on track by not being diverted). Having willpower
is not only about having the strength to deal with opposing
forces, but also about being able to persevere or persist for
as long as necessary in the face of struggle.
Courage is the fifth characteristic of combativeness.
Someone may have willpower but still fail due to being
overwhelmed by fear at a critical moment. Courage is
essential, which does not imply not having any fears, but
having the capacity to overcome fear (Woodard 2004).
Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007, p. 135) define moral courage
as ‘‘the ability to use inner principles to do what is good for
others, regardless of threat to self, as a matter of practice.’’
For them, moral courage is central to human flourishing as
individuals struggle with their desires. Kidder (2005, p. 7)
defines moral courage as ‘‘a commitment to moral princi-
ples, an awareness of the danger involved in supporting
those principles, and a willing endurance of that danger.’’
Courage is the readiness to endure danger and to ‘‘resist
temptations and social pressures’’ (Hannah et al. 2011,
p. 555) for the sake of remaining or becoming ethical (cf.
Koerner 2014).
The sixth characteristic of combativeness is confidence.
According to Armitage et al. (2014), self-efficacy has been
operationalized in two principal ways in the literature:
some studies operationalize self-efficacy as ‘global self-
efficacy,’ which captures general feelings of confidence in
one’s ability to achieve goals, such as losing weight,
whereas other studies focus on ‘self-efficacy for tempta-
tions’ which assesses people’s confidence in their ability to
overcome temptations, such as situations in which diets are
harder to follow. In both respects, confidence in one’s
combativeness is important to battle or struggle success-
fully. As Bandura (1977, p. X) puts it: ‘‘In order to succeed,
people need a sense of self-efficacy, strung together with
resilience to meet the inevitable obstacles and inequities of
life.’’
The seventh characteristic of combativeness is skill.
Dohm et al. (2001) found that the key difference between
weight maintenance success and failure was the skill to
deal with lapses. For De Ridder and De Wit (2006), a
fundamental part of self-regulatory behavior is the ability
to develop goal-setting skills. Being equipped with the
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right skills is important in order to engage the other aspects
of combativeness at the right moment, in the right pro-
portion, and in the right manner. In war, battles are won on
a tactical level through using the right skills (Greene 2007;
Shalit 1988).
To conclude, each of the above seven characteristics of
combativeness are expected to improve an ethics struggle
on each of its dimensions. This leads us to the next
proposition:
Proposition 3: The more the managers and employees
embody the seven characteristics of combativeness
discussed above, the better they struggle.
Organizational Combativeness
Combativeness is also an organizational virtue. Kaptein
(2011) has developed a model for organizational virtues
based on the argument organizations can be seen as moral
entities. The Corporate Ethical Virtues Model—abbrevi-
ated as CEV model—formulates organizational conditions
for managers and employees to behave ethically. This
model is also helpful in delineating the organizational
conditions for managers and employees to struggle
successfully.
The first characteristic of organizational combativeness
is clarity. In the CEV model, clarity concerns the extent to
which the organization makes clear to managers and
employees what kind of ethical behavior is expected of
them since vagueness and ambiguity are potential ante-
cedents to unethical behavior. In terms of struggling, this
means that when the organization makes clear to managers
and employees what the ambition, vision, and strategy of
the organization are, managers and employees are stimu-
lated to struggle as they know why and in which areas
struggle is required. Research shows that individuals deal
better with pressures and temptations if they have clear
goals (Pearson 2012; De Ridder and De Wit 2006). It
follows that an organization with clear goals would help
employees to struggle better.
A second characteristic of organizational combativeness
is role modeling. Managers are important role models
within organizations, as employees learn from them what
behavior is expected by observing their behavior (Brown
et al. 2005). Accordingly, role modeling is one of the
virtues of the CEV Model. Applied to struggling, the more
the management head and lead the struggle, the more the
employees are stimulated to follow suit. Furthermore, the
less the management struggle, the less the employees will
be motivated engage in ethical struggles.
A third characteristic is achievability. In the CEV
model, this refers to the extent to which employees have
sufficient time, budget, equipment, information, and
authority at their disposal to fulfill their ethical responsi-
bilities. Having insufficient resources not only brings about
unethical behavior (Schweitzer et al. 2004), it also dimin-
ishes the scope for managers and employees to struggle.
Research has shown that in order to resist temptations,
individuals need sufficient energy (cf. Muraven et al. 2006;
Tyler and Burns 2008). Barnes et al. (2011) also found that
unethical behavior can (in part) be related to lack of sleep,
which corresponds with the findings of Christian and Ellis
(2011) that theft and interpersonal deviance can be asso-
ciated with sleep deprivation. Hence, the better an orga-
nization is at providing managers and employees the
resources they need to struggle, the better the employees
are able to struggle.
A fourth characteristic of organizational combativeness
is commitment. The CEV model proposes commitment as
desirable because an organization characterized by demo-
tivation, mistrust, and dissatisfaction can be a breeding
ground for unethical behavior. The more effort an organi-
zation makes to motivate and instill loyalty among man-
agers and employees, the more likely it is that they will
behave ethically (Tyler and Blader 2005). Applied to the
idea of struggling, this means that the more commited
people are to an organization the more motivated they are
to struggle, and the more likely it is that they will struggle.
Managers and employees are, for example, motivated by
convincing and inspiring stories about why ethics and
struggling are relevant and also necessary. In organizations
characterized by internal distrust, managers and employees
are less likely to struggle together as mutual trust is an
important prerequisite for collaboration (Jones and George
1998).
A next characteristic of organizational combativeness is
transparency. In the CEV-model, transparency or visibility
refers to the degree to which (un)ethical behavior, and its
consequences are observable to those who can act upon it.
Several studies have shown the importance of transparency
because of its potential to expose unethical behavior and act
as deterrent owing to the increased likelihood of getting
caught (see, e.g., Cressey 1953). Research has demonstrated
that mindfulness can enhance self-control in the face of
pressure and temptations (Masicampo and Baumeister
2007). Mindfulness involves the cultivation of awareness of
physical signals as well as sensory experiences, thoughts,
and emotions (Brown and Ryan 2003; Weick and Sutcliffe
2006). This individual ability to self-monitor is a key ele-
ment in developing successful self-regulation (De Ridder
and De Wit 2006). Applied to organizations, mindfulness
implies, for example, monitoring developments that may
require new ethical norms. Such developments would
generate new pressures and temptations—and struggles—
which also need to be monitored as they become manifest
individually and collectively.
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Another characteristic of organizational combativeness is
discussability. Discussability in the CEV model refers to the
openness in the organization to discuss ethical dilemmas and
alleged unethical behavior. In their publication named
‘Identifying and battling temptation,’ Fishbach and Converse
(2010) emphasize the importance of identifying conflict.
According to them, people succumb to temptation because of
a failure to realize that their actions will be harmful. Applied
to organizations this means that within organizations, current
and potential conflicts are discussed so that managers and
employees become more aware of these conflicts, their con-
sequences, and the need to adequately deal with them.
Another application of the viewpoint of Fishbach and Con-
verse is that employees can raise the issues they experience in
their struggle and the struggles of others. For example, if
colleagues who cease their struggle cannot be called to
account it signals that struggling is not necessary which will
undermine the combativeness of managers and employees.
Furthermore, if they cannot raise ethical issues they are
struggling with, they are left to their own combativeness and
the potential advantage of joint struggle is missed.
A final characteristic of organizational combativeness is
sanctionability. Sanctionability or reinforcement in the
CEV model refers to the likelihood of employees being
punished for unethical behavior and rewarded for ethical
behavior. Because rewards and punishment are important
behavioral stimuli, rewards tend to lead to repetition and
punishment to avoidance (Trevin˜o et al. 2006). This not
only holds for ethical behavior in general but also for
struggling. Research by Trope and Fishbach (2000) shows
that individuals who reward themselves for resisting
temptations are better at resisting those temptations.
Organizations can also reward employees for resisting
opposing forces and impose punishment for failing to do
so. Organizations can also celebrate victories and express
regret when incidents occur.
To conclude, the above characteristics of organizational
combativeness are expected to improve an organization’s
struggle. This leads to the next proposition:
Proposition 4: The more an organization embodies the
seven characteristics of combativeness discussed
above, the better the managers and employees struggle.
Development of Combativeness
The concept of struggle becomes more relevant from a
managerial and normative perspective if combativeness
can be developed as a virtue. For Aristotle (Rowe and
Broadie 2002), virtues can be developed. Using their
muscle analogy, Baumeister and Exline (1999, 2000) hold
that virtues for self-control can be developed like muscles.
The organizational virtues the CEV model articulates can
also be developed given that, as Kaptein (2011) argues,
virtues can only be called virtues if they can be improved.
One way that virtues can be developed is through
practice. Aristotle wrote that habituation or ethismos
(ethos) follows from repetition; through the disciplining of
desire, painful things become pleasant, and brings into
being a second nature (eˆthos). Baumeister and Exline’s use
of the muscle analogy is to demonstrate that self-control
grows stronger with practice. Research by Muraven et al.
(1999) also shows that people who performed a series of
self-control exercises over several weeks were subse-
quently more resistant to new temptations. Muraven (2010)
found that the ability to exercise self-control improves with
regular practice of small acts of self-control. Research has
also shown that the regular performance of tasks requiring
self-regulation can increase willpower (Gailliot et al. 2007;
Oaten and Cheng, 2007).
Combativeness can also be developed through struggle
in real-life situations. As Moore (1907) points out, struggle
makes one stronger; battling opposing forces builds
strength to battle even greater opposing forces. Winning
small battles builds confidence to win bigger ones; pro-
vides an opportunity to learn from mistakes and avoid them
in bigger and potentially more fatal battles; provides
experience to deal with more complex struggles; and
increases resilience against greater pressures and tempta-
tions. Just like a muscle develops through the painful
damaging of fibers, so the endurance of pain can increase
combativeness. This ‘‘pathei mathos,’’ which was propa-
gated by Aeschylus, means that suffering chastens, and that
one learns through suffering (Jardine et al. 2014).
The development of combativeness does hold not only
for individuals but also for organizations. Organizational
virtues become embedded through practicing them. For
example, by regularly discussing issues surrounding par-
ticular ethical struggles, the virtue of organizational dis-
cussability becomes more entrenched. As muscles become
stronger by gradually increasing resistance—for example,
by lifting an extra kilo each month—organizational com-
bativeness can also grow through a gradual increase in
exposure to pressures and temptations. The fifth proposi-
tion reads as follows:
Proposition 5: The more the struggle is engaged in,
the more the individual and organizational combat-
iveness will grow.
Consequences of Struggle
Ethics Gap
The objective of an ethics struggle is to remain or become
ethical. Winning battles and successfully dealing with the
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opposing forces are meant to result in ethical behavior.
However, a struggle can also lead to defeat, a decline in
ethics, and unethical behavior, if the struggle—in terms of
the above described dimensions of a struggle—is insuffi-
cient or wrong, which could be the result of a lack of
personal and organizational combativeness. Therefore, an
ethics struggle as such is no guarantee for an ethics victory.
However, the better the struggle is, the more likely that the
ethics gap will become smaller, disappear or does not even
appear.
Besides the fact that struggle is laudable because it leads
to ethical behavior, struggle is also ethical in itself as it
demonstrates the recognition of a given ethical norm, the
need to protect or realize the norm, and the willingness to
fight against the pressures and temptations that threaten
upholding or adopting that norm. In keeping with Kant’s
(1785/2002) deontological ethics, engaging in ethics
struggles can be seen as a moral imperative because it is
the right thing to do. Struggle is therefore valuable in itself.
As Pascal (1910, p. 2) asserted: ‘‘The struggle alone
pleases us, not the victory.’’ Struggle is also virtuous as it
demonstrates the virtue of combativeness, and it is only in
struggle that one can show one’s combativeness. Engaging
in struggle is also virtuous as it demonstrates the value one
attaches to becoming or retaining ethicals. As Aristotle
pointed out, if being virtuous were always easy, we would
not praise it (Duska 2000). In that sense, struggling gives
insight into the meaning of ethical behavior.
Does this mean that when struggle is absent, ethics is
also absent? In situations where all pressures and tempta-
tions have been defeated or where organizations and
managers and employees have become immune to them, no
struggle would indeed be needed. However, the complete
absence of opposing forces or complete immunity to those
forces exists only in an ideal world; organizations operate
in an imperfect world, rife with tensions, risks, and defi-
ciencies. Moreover, even if there is a balance or equilib-
rium in the realization of stakeholder interests the
challenge always remains to do more or better. As long as
an organization damages or does not fully realize the
legitimate interest of at least one of its stakeholders, there
is room and reason for struggle. Therefore, if struggle is
absent, the realization of the legitimate interests of stake-
holders is not being pursued in the best manner possible.
To conclude, the next proposition is:
Proposition 6: The better the struggle is, the smaller
the ethics gap will be.
Struggling and Combativeness
As discussed above, practicing resistance of temptations
through struggle can improve personal and organizational
combativeness. However, struggling may also lead to a
decrease of combativeness, such as the ethics officer who
left the organization after she became too tired of strug-
gling to obtain a bigger budget and more attention from
management. Ego depletion theory (Baumeister and
Heatherton 1996) posits that self-control is a finite resource
that can be depleted. Research demonstrates that resisting
temptations requires exertion, which leads to fatigue and
consequently to temporary decreases in self-regulation, and
a higher susceptibility to engage to other types of unethical
behavior (Gailliot and Baumeister 2007; Gino et al. 2011;
Mead et al. 2009, Muraven et al. 1998). If resources are
taxed too much, struggling can thus lead to a decrease in
combativeness. This holds both on individual as well as
organizational level. For example, when an organization
invests a lot of resources into recovering from an ethics
crisis, members of the organization may become exhaus-
ted, and the resources may run out. As a consequence, both
the support for ethics (organizational commitment) and the
available means (organizational achievability) decrease.
This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 7: An ethics struggle leads to less com-
bativeness if one or more of the characteristics of
combativeness are decreased or depleted.
Ethics Gap and Combativeness
Defeat in an ethics struggle creates an ethics gap, which
can lead to an even bigger gap. A bigger ethics gap is
caused by, for example, a decline in willpower as a result
of defeat. Unethical behavior can impact negatively on an
individual or organization’s self-image (as becoming or
remaining ethical). In order to restore this damaged self-
image, the individual or organization could attach less
importance to ethics, thus increasing the risk of further
unethical behavior (cf. Shao et al. 2008). Also, the greater
this gap, the more combativeness is required to bridge the
gap, the realization of which may lead to reduced confi-
dence in the organization or individual’s ability to close
that gap.
However, an ethics gap can prompt management to take
action to bridge the gap. The greater the gap, the more
visible the gap and its current or potential negative impact,
thus the more likely it is to receive attention from man-
agement due to the urgency to improve the situation
(Ocasio 1997). Succumbing to the temptation to rationalize
a smaller gap—as a mistake, an incident, or the case of one
rotten apple—is easier than in the case of a large gap
(Tenbrunsel and Messick 2004). Although large gaps can
also be rationalized, for example, with the argument that
‘‘everyone is doing it’’ or ‘‘without it business is impossi-
ble,’’ it is more difficult because it requires a more
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extensive rationalization. Organizations and individuals
may therefore be more willing to struggle when greater
effort is required, such as in the event of an ethics crisis
prompting the implementation of a new business model,
than when less effort is required.
The absence of an ethics gap can also lead to less
combativeness because it could create the impression that
everything is under control. This can lead to ethics
receiving less attention, while more attention is being paid
to other issues (Ocasio 1997). The absence of an ethics gap
could even lead to complacency, especially in the face of
the false belief that an individual or organization has
become undefeatable, which can result in a significant
decrease in the awareness that struggling remains impor-
tant. When an ethics gap is (almost) entirely absent, the
pressure to decrease efforts in order to achieve the same
results more efficiently is likely to occur. When unethical
behavior is (almost) absent, it becomes harder to justify the
investment of resources because little or no damage is
being caused by unethical behavior. The absence of an
ethics gap may therefore lead to a reduction in attention to
ethics, thereby increasing the risk of unethical behavior
occurring. The final two propositions therefore are
Proposition 8: An ethics gap that creates an increase
in combativeness leads to an increase in struggle.
Proposition 9: An ethics gap that causes a decline in
combativeness leads to a decline in struggle.
Discussion
This paper has presented a first outline of a theory of ethics
struggle to explain the occurence and frequency of uneth-
ical behavior in organizations. One reason why organiza-
tions fail to adopt new ethical norms or maintain existing
ethical norms is that managers and employees do not
struggle sufficiently. Managers and employees need to
struggle because they are faced with pressures and temp-
tations in their work which they are susceptible to. To
argue that ethics struggles are unnecessary is to deny the
flawed nature of organizations and human beings as well as
the nature of ethical norms which is that they are subject to
change.
In this paper, a basic model has been developed to
describe the dimensions, conditions, and consequences of
ethics struggles in and by organizations. To recapitulate,
the dimensions of an ethics struggle are object, location,
duration, intensity, and strategy: its conditions are personal
and organizational combativeness; and the consequences of
an ethics struggle are defeat (the creation or increase of an
ethics gap) or victory (the decrease or dissolution of an
ethics gap and the adoption of new norms). The virtues of
both personal combativeness and organizational combat-
iveness comprise seven characteristics. The more combat-
ive the organizations and the individuals are the better they
are able to struggle, and the more likely ethics gaps will
become smaller, disappear, or be prevented. One way to
develop combativeness is through struggling.
The proposed theory of struggling is both pessimistic—
given the existence of pressures and temptations, as well as
the human proclivity to do evil—as well as optimistic—
given that organizations and individuals have a capacity to
struggle, and combativeness can be developed and strug-
gling can indeed lead to a reduction in unethical behavior
and an increase in ethical behavior. The proposed theory is
also both positive, in that it presents a model to explain
ethical and unethical behaviors in organizations, and nor-
mative, in that it presents ethical norms for what organi-
zations and individuals should be (combative) and do
(struggle). The proposed theory is also multilevel; organi-
zational combativeness and struggling may influence
individuals, but individuals’ combativeness and struggling
may also influence organizations.
Struggle theory contributes to business ethics literature
in at least two ways. First, struggle theory presents a new
view of organizations, namely the organization as a bat-
tlefield. Morgan (1986) points out that our view of orga-
nizations influences our analyses, findings and
recommendations for organizations. However, many pub-
lications in the business ethics literature do not present,
refer to or acknowledge any particular view of organiza-
tions or individuals. Without making such a view explicit,
we cannot fully understand presented models and findings.
This paper is therefore also an attempt to encourage
business ethics scholars to account for their view and to
seek to seek out views that would be helpful in under-
standing ethical an unethical behavior of organizations and
their constituents.
A second contribution of this paper is the development
of the concept of struggle, which to date has not received
systematic attention in the business ethics literature. The
proposed concept of a struggle is an essential part of
organizations and individuals. It contributes to a more
balanced approach to business ethics in at least three ways.
The theory of struggle places the ethics of individuals and
organizations on a continuum. The Bad Apple and Bad
Barrel theory of Trevin˜o and Youngblood (1990) treats
individuals (the apples) and organizations (the barrels) as
either good or bad. The proposed theory and concept of
struggle view individuals and organizations as both good
and bad, and the difference between being and doing more
good than bad as something best understood in terms of a
continuum.
The theory of struggle is also more balanced in the sense
that it views ethical norms as dynamic. Behavioral business
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ethics theories, for example, often perceive ethical norms
as static or treat them as given (see Trevin˜o et al. 2006).
This, however, neglects the emergence of new ethical
norms and risks organizations failing to acknowledge,
adopt, and implement them. Struggle theory pays attention
to the challenges involved in adopting these new norms,
and how it can lead to unethical behavior.
A struggle theory is finally also more balanced in that it
does not shy away from those features of organizations that
are intractable. Ethical dilemmas receive much attention in
the business ethics literature. However, the approach to
dealing with these dilemmas is usually rational, in the
sense of developing arguments for solving them. The the-
ory of struggle also addresses the emotional and psycho-
logical dimensions of ethical dilemmas and behavior,
through acknowledging the fears, uncertainties, and the
pain that come into play. The way in which organizations
are advised to manage ethics can be described as relatively
clinical, in the sense that organizations are advised to adopt
an ethics program consisting of a limited number of
instruments (Weaver and Trevin˜o 1999) which should be
implemented in a straightforward manner (Trevin˜o and
Weaver 2001) and supported by management (Weaver
et al. 1999b). The theory of struggle emphasizes the chal-
lenges involved in embedding and maintaining an ethics
program and treats it, not as a linear process, but as an
iterative process of winning, stagnation, loss, and recovery
that requires wrestling and muddling through. In their
research among ethics officers, Trevin˜o et al. (2014)
helpfully already hint at the clashes, challenges, and diffi-
culties they face in their function.
A struggle theory of ethics also has the potential to
contribute to institutional theory. Institutional theory
focusses on organizations’ response to institutional norms
and normative pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1997), which is another type
of pressure (the direction of which is more desirable) than
the one operationalized in this paper. The concept of
decoupling is central here and refers to the gaps that arise
between symbolically adopted formal policies and actual
organizational practice (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver
1991). Although institutional norms are not by definition
ethical and ethical norms are not necessarily institutional-
ized, the concept of struggle helps to explain why decou-
pling occurs. Decoupling points to the existence of an
ethics gap, while an organization pretends that there is no
ethics gap, and it can be the result of a lack of combat-
iveness in organizations or individuals, and a failure to
struggle sufficiently or adequately as a result. Decoupling
in this case would be the result of a failure to struggle or a
struggle that has been lost, which carries the risk of more
unethical behavior, like misrepresentation, lies, and fraud
being required to hide the gap, thus increasing the already
existing ethics gap. In that sense, decoupling is not nec-
essarily, as Tilcsik (2010) suggests, a state of affairs
favored by management; it can also be the result of
exhaustion or desperation or denial of the need for struggle.
Accordingly, struggle theory explains why organizations
have the ability to recouple.
A theory of struggle also has the potential to contribute
to the theories of self-regulation, also called self-control or
self-efficacy, as developed in the discipline of psychology.
This paper has drawn on these theories to develop a theory
of struggle as these theories are also concerned with the
way in which individuals deal with temptations. The con-
tribution of struggle theory as presented in this paper is that
it not only focusses on individuals but also on the condi-
tions in organizations that enable individual employees to
struggle. This interplay has thus far not been addressed (cf.
Vohs and Baumeister 2011). A struggle theory for orga-
nizations also opens the door to studying not only how
individuals but also groups of individuals, like teams and
units, deal with temptations. Moreover, self-regulation
theory focuses on existing norms and how to deal with
temptations that undermine the realization of these norms.
The presented struggle theory also highlights the emer-
gence of new norms that may require different strategies
for dealing with temptations and pressures. Another
potential contribution is that the proposed characteristics of
combativeness presented in this paper are richer than the
characteristics of self-control and self-regulation that have
been proposed to date by, for example, Vohs and
Baumeister (2011). Characteristics such as wisdom and
moral conviction may add explanatory power to self-con-
trol. As such, combativeness is not just a moral muscle—it
encompasses the mind, heart, and soul.
Scientific Implications
A theory of struggle has multiple implications. One of the
implications is that if there is no struggle, an organization
is at risk of an ethics gap arising. Due to the fact that we
live in an imperfect world, it is impossible to always fully
meet the legitimate interests of all stakeholders. Struggle is
therefore not only ethical, but it also implies that the
absence of struggle is unethical. It is unethical in the sense
that the absence of struggle indicates that not enough effort
is being made to realize the legitimate interests and
expectations of stakeholders. This, however, is not to imply
that the more an organization or individual struggles, the
more ethical they are. Whether a struggle is more or less
laudable depends on, for example, whether the struggle is
recurring or novel. It is more laudable when an employee
struggles with accepting or refusing a bribe for the first
time than when the struggle occurs every time the same
type of bribe is offered. This is because it shows a lack of
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growth in combativeness or lack of ability to learn from
experience and devise an effective strategy to eliminate
pressures and temptations.
That struggling is ethical is also not to imply that a
struggle cannot be unethical. Organizations and individuals
can, for example, struggle too much. According to Aristotle
(Rowe and Broadie 2002), every virtue is the mean
between two vices. Hence, combativeness is the mean
between cowardice and zealotry. To argue that struggling is
ethical does not mean that one should always be struggling,
and as much as possible. The art of struggling also requires
knowing when not to struggle (any longer). In this regard,
Oliver (1991) notes how organizations can overreact when
they are confronted with unethical behavior. Furthermore,
it is also possible for organizations and individuals to
struggle in a manner that is unethical. To say that strug-
gling is ethical is not to suggest that all means to this end
are ethical, as the end does not justify the means (cf. Kant
1785/2002). Hence, struggling through lying, intimidation,
and disrespect is not ethical. A struggle is also unethical
when it is motivated by unethical reasons (such as
revenge), aimed toward unethical goals, or when then the
struggle is merely an end in itself.
To stress the importance of the concept of struggle is not
to imply that struggling is the explanation for and solution
to all unethical behavior. Pressures and temptations may be
so great that any struggle would fail. Moreover, unethical
behavior can occur even in the absence of pressures and
temptations, for example, due to ignorance (cf. Trevin˜o
et al. 2006). Neither does the concept of struggle suggest
that there can be no ethical behavior without struggle.
Ethical behavior can also occur, for example, out of habit,
as Aristotle (Rowe and Broadie 2002) argued.
The proposed struggle theory and its propositions offer
possibilities for follow-up research. Relevant in this regard
is how to assess the different constructs. Although this
paper identifies and defines different aspects, more work is
needed to render them measurable. For example, as in the
case of the different dimensions of the CEV model (cf.
Kaptein 2011), organizational combativeness could be
measured by means of a survey. The same applies to
individual combativeness which can be measured through
self-assessments or an assessments performed by others.
The size of ethics gaps could also be measured by means of
a survey. However, existing scales for surveying unethical
behavior, such as of Kaptein (2008), contain static norms.
The intensity of struggling can be measured, for example,
by assessing the functioning of the brains (Heatherton and
Wagner 2011).
This paper offers a simple model of struggling for
individuals and organizations. As for the antecedents of
struggling, new research may focus on what explains the
combativeness of organizations, to what extent the
combativeness between organizations differs, and the
different patterns in the development of the combative-
ness of organizations. Follow-up research may also focus
on how each of the different characteristics of combat-
iveness contributes to the other aspects of combativeness,
as well as the overall combativeness, and how organiza-
tional and individual combativeness are related to each
other. Is organizational clarity, for example, mainly
related to individual wisdom, organizational role model-
ing mainly related to strong moral convictions, and
organizational achievability mainly related to individual
willpower? A relevant question is also to what extent we
can expect combativeness of organizations and individu-
als. For example, Gini (2011) posits that courage is not a
superhuman virtue or indicative of supernumerary. In the
model developed in this paper, training and practice were
suggested as a way to develop the combativeness of
organizations and individuals. Future research may also
try to find other instruments for this. Regarding struggling
itself, a crucial question is what type of struggle is needed
in which situation. How do we explain or determine
which strategy is the most effective? More in-depth
knowledge is also needed to understand how struggles
develop. Regarding the consequences of struggle, we
focused on ethical consequences and combativeness.
Other consequences of struggling can also be considered,
such as the psychological effect it has on individuals.
Lachman (2007) posits that personal sacrifice is often
accompanied by a sense of peace because the individual
stood up for a nonnegotiable principle. Kelly (1998),
however, found that the struggle of nurses to preserve
their moral integrity resulted in moral stress. Another
possible consequence of struggle is that it can elicit a
reaction from opposing forces. They can fight back (cut-
ting budgets or spreading gossip), use larger ‘weapons’
(e.g., making threats of job-cuts), or direct their attention
to less combative organizations or individuals (e.g.,
offering bribes to one employee after the other until one
accepts).
This paper has developed a struggle theory for ethical
behavior. The concept of struggle is already being used in
relation to other management issues such as power (Flig-
stein 1987), control (Freeland 2001), maladies (Koerner
2014), disputes (Keltner 1994), ambiguity (Alvesson
1993), competition (Hunt and Morgan 1996), and talent
management (McDonnell et al. 2011). However, to date no
theory or model exist that explains the nature of struggle on
organizational and individual level and what its ante-
cedents and consequences are. Future research may there-
fore examine to what extent the proposed ethical struggle
theory can be applied to these issues, as well as other issues
that require great efforts such as innovation, efficiency, and
strategy development.
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Implications for Management
The main idea of this paper is that in order for organiza-
tions to be and to remain ethical, struggle is required,
because without, the ethics of an organization is at risk.
This requires that the individuals that constitute organiza-
tions develop the virtue of combativeness. For manage-
ment, adopting the theory of struggle implies viewing their
organization as a battlefield, not in the sense of the fre-
quently used metaphor or competing with and beating
competitors (e.g., Prahalad 1999), but a battlefield con-
sisting of pressures and temptations that need to be con-
quered so as to defend ethics and realize the good. This
also implies a view of employees and management as
potential victims and victors of opposing forces within and
outside themselves and the organization.
A struggle approach has implications for ethical lead-
ership, which is usually defined as visibly adhering to
ethical norms and creating the conditions for followers to
comply with those norms (Brown and Trevin˜o 2006). In the
framework of struggle theory, ethical leadership also con-
cerns defining new ethical norms. Just following prevailing
ethical norms amounts to maintenance. If managers want to
be ethical leaders they should be alert to and anticipate
developments and issues that will require new ethical
norms and come up with ethical norms addressing these in
advance. Ethical leadership does not require managers to
be in the first row on the front (like generals in the army
should not be in the first row in a battle). However, the
manager perhaps occupies the position most exposed to
pressures and temptations, which requires them to struggle
the most. At the same time, when they are selected on their
ethical combativeness they should be the ones with the
least difficulty dealing with pressures and temptations.
Another implication for ethical leadership is not to expect
managers to act like saints (Alvesson 2011). A struggle
theory recognizes that all individuals possess a mixture of
good and bad inclinations and no one is exempt from
facing difficulties or even suffering defeat when dealing
with pressures and temptations. Without rationalizing
giving into pressures and temptations, managers could be
more open about their struggles so that others can learn
from them and they from others.
A struggle theory has specific implications for those
whose main function in an organization is to struggle for
ethics. Those persons, such as ethics officers, run the risk of
becoming frustrated, annoyed, or desperate. A view of
ethics as struggle is encouraging in that it offers skills to
deal with adversities and obstacles. Given the imperfect
nature of organizations and human beings, and the possi-
bility that a struggle may fail, it is unrealistic to expect all
conditions to be in place and all behavior always to be
ethical. An ethics officer that gets so frustrated about the
lack of cooperation in their organization that they step
down may have had too optimistic a view of ethics in
business. If being ethical were easy and simple, the man-
agement of ethics and the function of ethics officer would
not be necessary. An ethics officer exists because of the
need to struggle for attention, time and budget. Such a
struggle does not undermine their legitimacy, as Trevin˜o
et al. (2014b) suggest, but demonstrates it.
A struggle theory also has implications for the ethics
program an organization runs. Implementing an ethics
program is not just a matter of using the right measures
(‘weapons’). It is also a matter of putting effort into
deciding which measures to take (e.g., convincing man-
agement that a code is desirable), their content (e.g., per-
suading management about the content of a code),
implementing them (e.g., convincing managers and
employees to change their behavior), and ensuring that they
are effective (e.g., convincing managers to periodically
monitor adherence to the code in their unit). As mentioned
above, there is a always the risk that once an ethics pro-
gram is in place and unethical behavior is not at the fore-
front of everyone’s minds, the ethics program is neglected
until unethical behavior becomes a significant issue again.
Management should therefore not become complacent or
reduce time and effort invested in an ethics program
because no major incidents have occurred for some time.
Indeed, the absence of a pressing need to address (the
frequency of) unethical behavior testifies to the effective-
ness of the investment in a particular ethics program.
A struggle theory also has implications for ethics
training. Many organizations use e-learning methods to
train their managers and employees in ethics (KPMG
2014). Others run classroom sessions in which they train
managers and employees in analyzing and solving dilemma
scenarios presented to them. Although these methods could
be effective (Warren et al. 2014), it does not fully train
employees in struggling, as these methods do not face
participants with real consequences, and therefore the
fears, pain and suffering of a struggle. Struggle theory
emphasizes learning by doing. This means that it is
important that organizations provide their managers and
employees ethics training on the job through the use of
check-ins, time-outs, interim reflections, feedback and
feedforward, and coaching. Warner et al. (2011) have
found some evidence that ethics training for soldiers during
combat leads to a decline in unethical behavior. McKee
and Ntoumanis (2014) also show how an intervention
program promoting self-regulatory skills could lead to
improved weight loss. The need for training, or experience,
also suggests that people should not prematurely be
appointed to functions that are subject to great pressures
and temptations. Human Resource Management can assist
by conducting assessments of the combativeness of
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applicants and measuring the results against the pressures
and temptations of the function in question. If an organi-
zation still wishes to develop the combativeness of
employees in a laboratory situation, gaming could poten-
tially be considered given its proximity to real-life situa-
tions (Littlejohn and Pegler 2014).
Viewing ethics as a struggle also has consequences for
the controls in an organization. Controls are meant to reduce
the pressures and temptations in a function (Simons and
Chabris 1999). For example, the control of dual signing to
authorize an invoice reduces the temptation to commit
fraud. Katz-Navon et al. (2005) argue that there should be a
balance between rules and autonomy because too many
rules reduce people’s sense of responsibility. A struggle
theory extends this argument by holding that people who
are faced with too few pressures and temptations will
struggle too little and become less combative. When, for
example, an organization adopts a three-lines-of-defense
compliance model, where the first line is management and
their units; the second line is staff like quality, safety, legal,
finance, and compliance; and the third line is audit; it runs
the risk that when the second line is given too much
authority, the first line feels less responsible for ethics and
becomes reactive and less combative. Therefore, organi-
zations should actively seek a balance between exposing
managers and employees to pressures and temptations and
protecting them against pressures and temptations.
For management and employees, it is ultimately
important how they approach struggle in their daily work.
This paper has presented a spectrum of five strategies. To
determine which strategy would be best suited to a par-
ticular situation, and how such a strategy is to be opera-
tionalized into successful tactical interventions, however,
will require further research.
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